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We are in the midst of "Europe '92," the year when the European
Community (EC) is to take on new shape and substance as it seeks trans-
formation to economic and political strategies intended to enhance its
position in international trade and commerce. With respect to matters of
information processing and transborder data flow,1 the Council of Eu-
rope has prepared a draft directive concerning privacy and security re-
garding personal information (Privacy Directive).2 That draft, under
* A.B., J.D., University of Michigan; Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Informat-
ics Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois where he teaches the Information Law
and Policy, and Privacy Law seminars. During the Ford Administration, Professor Trubow served
as general counsel to the Committee on the Right to Privacy, Executive Office of the President. He
is also the Editor-in-Chief of Privacy Law and Practice, a three volume set published by Matthew
Bender.
The author expresses his appreciation and gratitude for the invaluable assistance in preparation
of this article of Timothy R. Rabel, Research Director for the Center for Informatics Law.
1 Lisa J. Damon, Note, Freedom of Information Versus National Sovereignty: The Need For A
New Global Forum for the Resolution of Transborder Data Flow Problems, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
262, 263, n.3 (1986-87) (defining transborder data flow also known as transnational data flow as the
exchange of information from one country to another).
2 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in
Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, 1990 O.J. (C 277/03) 3 [hereinafter Privacy Directive].
This Privacy Directive is to give effect to the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 317.
Id. (22), at 4.
There are eight EC nations that have ratified the Convention: Denmark, France, Federal Re-
public of Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Greg
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consideration by the member states, is of great importance to the rest of
the world since it contemplates that EC members will not exchange in-
formation with nations that do not comply with the directive's proto-
cols. 3 The United States would be in a precarious position were our
business communities to be excluded from personal information ex-
change with European nations because our processing of such informa-
tion fails to meet the EC privacy tests.4
In addition to the Privacy Directive is a companion proposal regard-
ing telecommunications.5 That draft imposes additional privacy con-
Tucker, International Legal Notes: Privacy Protection and Transborder Data Flows, 65 AUSTRALIAN
L.J. 354, 354 (1991); Rosemary Patricia Jay, Transborder Data Flows, NEW L.J., Feb. 22, 1991, at
241, 249. Belgium, Greece, Italy and Portugal are also member states of the EC but have not yet
ratified the Convention. Tucker, supra at 354.
3 The EC's law making authority is entrusted to four bodies, the Executive Commission, the
Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. E.C. DELEGATION TO THE
UNrrED STATES, A GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 5 (1991)[hereinafter E.C. Delegation].
The Commission consists of 17 members from the various states and is responsible for proposing
Community policies and legislation to the Council of Ministers which then enacts the laws. Id. at 6,
7. As the communities "public forum," the European Parliament has the ability to amend proposed
legislation and the Court of Justice serves as the Community's Supreme Court responsible for inter-
preting and ensuring proper application of the Community laws and treaties. Id. at 8.
There are four types of "legislation" within the Community; regulations which are completely
binding and self-executing, directives which leave the states to adopt their own laws to carry out the
directives' objectives, decisions which bind those named within the decision and recommendations
and opinions which serve as guidance. Id. at 9. As the EC's "legislative" process, the Commission
submits proposed legislation to the Council which the Parliament expresses an opinion on. The
Council then "adopts a common position" which is presented to Parliament for approval, disap-
proval or amendment. Needing to act within three months or the proposal will die, the Commission
through a "second reading" can pass a Parliamentary rejected proposal only with a unanimous vote.
Or, if Parliament amends the proposal and the amendments are supported by the Commission, the
Council can pass the proposal by a "qualified majority," otherwise a unanimous vote is needed.
EMILE NOtiL, WORKING TOGETHER - THE INsTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 35-36
(1988) (available from Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities,
ISBN 92-825-8526-3); E.C. DELEGATION, supra, at 7-8.
Although the Council is ultimately responsible for adopting the proposals, the Parliament does
carry weight in that it significantly controls the EC budget and can dissolve the Commission with a
two thirds vote. NOEL, supra, at 35 (control over EC budget); E.C. DELEGATION, supra, at 8 ("vote
of censure" to dissolve Commission).
4 Other nations have also expressed concerns over the European directives and the possibility of
being denied the transfer of data. For example, on November 23, 1990 Hong Kong Secretary of
Home affairs Peter Tsao announced plans to pass legislation that would bring Hong Kong's policy
up to the standards required by the European directives. While a Working Group was created to
investigate and form a policy for the country, a Law Reform Commission was to re-evaluate the
country's general privacy law and to specifically address data protection. Hong Kong Government
Finally Opts for Data Protection, NEWSWIRE ASAP(TM), Nov. 23, 1990, available in DIALOG,
(reported by Norman Wingrove).
One Australian commentator notes that although Australia has scattered privacy protection
laws, taken has a whole "it may be safely adjudged that this mishmash of laws would not be ade-
quate in all cases." Tucker, supra note 2, at 355.
5 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Personal Data
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straints on the European telecommunications industry. Before we
consider the implications of these proposals with respect to the United
States we ought to review the recent history and current state of affairs in
this country regarding the matter of informational privacy.
First, an explanation of how some words and phrases are used in
this article will promote clarity. The general subject of informational
privacy deals with the collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of
personal information, which is any information describing a natural per-
son. It is the reference and not the content of information that deter-
mines its classification as personal, for if information refers to an
identifiable individual then it is personal. It does not matter whether the
reference is by name or number or other identifying characteristics so
long as the reference identifies a specific individual.6
Privacy is a characteristic of a natural person, and in informational
terms considers how personal information is gathered, stored and used.7
Confidentiality is a characteristic of information and indicates that cer-
tain information is available only to certain people under specific circum-
stances. Security, a characteristic of information systems, concerns the
technology and procedures to assure that information in a system is not
lost, altered or disclosed without proper authority. Thus, system security
implements the confidentiality of information which in turn protects per-
sonal privacy.
A record or file is a collection of information and a data element is a
and Privacy in the Context of Public Digital Telecommunications Networks, in Particular the Inte-
grated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and Public Digital Mobile Networks, 1990 O.J. (C 277/04)
12 [hereinafter Telecommunications Directive].
6 The Privacy Directive uses and defines "personal data" as information that can be associated
with a particular individual or data subject by use of an identification number or fact. To "deperson-
alize" is the process in which personal data is changed to such an extent that great efforts are needed
to identify the individual to which the information relates. Privacy Directive, supra note 2, ch. I, art.
2, (a)-(b), at 5.
7 In this country, corporations are not regarded as having privacy. See, eg., Browning-Ferris
Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (corporation has no right to privacy));
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 34 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (corporations denied constitutional right to privacy); Noble Oil Co. v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d
729, 730 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 6521 (1981)
(corporation cannot succeed on any of four privacy torts).
However, the European countries may regard corporations as having privacy. Article 3 of the
Council of Europe's Convention For the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 317, 1981 states that the basic principle for
data protection apply to "persons, associations, foundations, companies, corporations and any other
bodies consisting directly or indirectly of individuals, whether or not such bodies possess legal per-
sonality." See generally, David C. Boyle, Note, Proposal to Amend the United States Privacy Act to
Extend its Protections to Foreign Nationals and Non-Resident Aliens, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 285
(1989) (compares Privacy Act with foreign data protection laws).
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"piece" of information in the file.8 The data subject is the one to whom
personal information refers; an identifier is the data element that con-
nects personal information with a specific data subject. The record
holder is the person or entity that controls access to a collection of stored
information - the Europeans use the phrase "controller of the fle."9 To
access a file is to gain entry to the record, and to disclose or disseminate
information is to communicate information to a third party - someone
other than the data subject or record holder.
This country's development of informational privacy, which was
spurred by the rapid advance of computer technology in the early 1970s,
attracted the serious attention of our federal government to the matter of
data privacy and security. The relative ease with which automated data
allows information to be stored, retrieved and disseminated suggests the
need to adequately protect that information. 10
The first comprehensive government inquiry into the question was
made by a task force appointed by then-Secretary of Health Education
and Welfare, Elliott Richardson, who had become concerned about the
vast amounts of personal information stored in his Department's increas-
ingly automated files. That report, issued in 1973, presented a survey of
8 The Privacy Directive also defines "personal data file" as a collection of personal data that
either through automation or organization allows for efficient use of the information with and
"processing" as "the recording, storage or combination of data, and their alteration, use or commu-
nication, including transmission, dissemination, retrieval, blocking and erasure." Privacy Directive,
supra note 2, ch. I, art. 2 J (b)-(c). Also defined in the Privacy Directive is "public sector" which
includes all entities in a member state that is regulated by that state's "public law" excluding those
entities that "carry on industrial or commercial activity" and entities that, although not regulated by
public law, participate in "the exercise of official authority;" and the "private sector" which includes
any person or entity and public sector organization that "carry[s] on an industrial or commercial
activity." Privacy Directive, supra note 2, ch. I, art. 2, at 5.
9 The "controller of the file" is the entity under Community or member state law that deter-
mines the use of, contents of, application to and access to the file. Id. ch. 1, art. 2, at 5.
10 Marketplace is a CD-ROM which Lotus was going to introduce and clearly illustrates the
potential privacy invasions that computers and data compilation presents. This computer disk
which was to be commercially available contained personal information on 80 million United States
Households and profiles on 120 million Americans. Data included names, addresses, ages, genders,
marital statuses, household incomes, lifestyles, types of dwellings and buying propensities for certain
products. None of these data subjects consented to this potential disclosure. Data Protection, Com-
puters, and Changing Information Practicer Hearing Before the Government Information, Justice,
and Agriculture Subcomm. of the Comm on Government Operations House of Representatives, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1990) [hereinafter Data Protection Hearing] (summary statement of Marc
Rotenberg, Director, Washington Office, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, Profes-
sor Mary J. Culnan, School of Business Administration, Georgetown University and Dr. Ronni
Rosenberg, National Science Foundation Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univer-
sity). However, due do the outcry of 30,000 of the data subjects, for at least now, Lotus has canceled
distribution of the product. Lotus Pulls Out of MarketPlace (Cancels CD-ROM Target Marketing
Products because Consumers Complain it Violates Privacy Rights), MACWEEK, Jan. 29, 1991, avail-
able in DIALOG (by Carolyn Said).
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federal records in HEW and examined the use of the Social Security
Number (SSN). The Task Force developed a list of "fair information
practices" that have become conventional wisdom regarding records
management and privacy. The essence of those principals may be re-
phrased thus:
1. Maintain no secret information systems. (A "secret" system is
one whose existence and purpose is known only to a select few.)
2. Collect only that information necessary to the lawful purpose of
a record system, and when feasible collect personal information directly
from the data subject.
3. Be sure that the information is relevant, accurate, timely and
complete.
4. Provide the data subject with access to information about him-
self and a procedure by which to challenge and correct that information.
5. Use data only for the particular purpose for which it was ini-
tially collected except as permitted by the specific, informed consent of
the data subject. (This is generally referred to as the "secondary use"
limitation.)
6. Protect data against unauthorized disclosure, alteration or loss.
(The "security" principle).11
Though these principles are often cited as the foundation for infor-
mational privacy, most are common sense which can apply to any record
system regardless of the kind of information it contains. These princi-
ples were incorporated into the Privacy Act of 1974,12 legislation aimed
to protect personal information in federal records systems.
In addition, the federal effort in the late 1960s to help state and local
government fight crime directed a great deal of money to the develop-
ment of new criminal justice information systems - and that meant
computers. The Crime Control Act of 1973"3 required the Department
of Justice to develop guidelines to assure the "security and privacy" of
criminal history information, 14 and in 1976, after protracted hearings
and consultation with state and local law enforcement authorities and
with public interest groups, the Department issued its regulations 5
11 Secretary Advisory Comm. on Automated Personal Data Systems, U.S. Dept. of Health, Edu-
cation & Welfare, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens (1973) (OSHEW Publication No.
(D)73-94).
12 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
13 Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-83, 87 Stat. 197 (amending Title I of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701 - 3795).
14 Id. § 523(b) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 3789(g)(b) (1988)).
15 41 Fed. Reg. 11,715 (March 19, 1976) (codified as amended 28 C.F.R. §§ 20.1 to 20.38
(1991)).
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which reflect the general thrust of the fair information practices. 16
During the years of the Ford presidency (1974-76) the Domestic
Council Committee on the Right to Privacy also studied the information
practices of federal agencies and supported passage of the Privacy Act.
The foregoing principles of fair information practices were the Commit-
tee's benchmark against which procedures to protect informational pri-
vacy were evaluated. 17
The EC Privacy Directive discussed herein will be seen to contain
little if anything that is new to America in terms of protocol for personal
information.'" Many of the concepts are reflected in other federal legisla-
tion such as the Right to Financial Privacy Act,19 the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act,20 and the Family Educational Right to Privacy Act.2 In
those Acts, the right of access and review by the data subject,22 require-
ments for data accuracy 23 and limitations on access by third parties are
common elements.24
16 28 C.F.R. § 20.33 (only certain groups are to receive criminal history information); 28 C.F.R.
§ 20.34(a) (data subject is to have access to his records); 28 C.F.R. § 20.34(b) (data subject can
challenge the accuracy and completeness of the records); 28 C.F.R. § 20.37 (agency contributing
data must assure the completeness and accuracy of its records.)
17 The Privacy Act of 1974 also established the Privacy Protection Commission which was to
conduct a study of various private and governmental data banks, and computer and information
processing systems ultimately producing standards to insure the protection of "personal informa-
tion." Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1905. The Commission published its report entitled THE
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1977), and pursuant to Pub. L. 93-579, § 5(g), discontinued operation on September 30, 1977.
18 For example, a common theme running through all U.S. data protection laws is "[a]ny infor-
mation obtained for one purpose should not be used for another purpose without the consent of the
person." Data Protection Hearing, supra note 10, at 111 (summary statement of Marc Rotenberg,
Director, Washington Office, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, Professor Mary J.
Colnan, School of Business Administration, Georgetown University and Dr. Ronni Rosenberg, Na-
tional Science Foundation Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University).
19 Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988).
20 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988) (amended Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146).
21 Family Educational Right to Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1988) (was part of the Educa-
tional Amendments of 1974).
22 12 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (can access the records of disclosures); 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (data subject
has access right); 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (ability to challenge data accuracy); 20 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(1)(A)
(denial of federal funds for refusing student access to his records).
23 15 U.S.C. § 1681e (must "assure maximum possible accuracy"); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(a)(1)(C)(2) (allow challenges to accuracy).
24 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (restricts government access); 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (release of records prohib-
ited); 15 U.S.C. 1681b (list of only instances of permitted record disclosure); 20 U.S.C.
§ § 1232g(b)(1), (2) (no federal funds for schools that release records).
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IL SUMMARY OF THE EUROPEAN DRAFT PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 2 5
A. General Overview
The treaty which governs the European Economic Community pro-
motes economic and social growth while protecting individual funda-
mental rights that are found in each member state's constitution.26 The
Privacy Directive seeks to balance the needs of its members to collect and
exchange data against the protection of "fundamental rights" that may
be infringed by the processing of personal data.27 The right of privacy is
considered a fundamental right.2 8
The Privacy Directive was developed with an awareness that tech-
nology has increased to the point that transfer of personal data across
national borders has become essential and almost effortless. 29 Noting
that because the several Community members' differing approaches to
the protection of personal data might impede economic ventures between
member states,3" the Directive seeks harmonization of privacy laws to
allow for a proper flow of personal data. While the minimum protec-
tions identified in the Privacy Directive are to be recognized by all mem-
bers, each may provide additional protection to personal data if it so
chooses.32 To prevent a conflict of laws which could develop when files
pertaining to the same data subject are maintained in more than one
member state, the laws of a jurisdiction control records within that juris-
diction but do not have extraterritorial effect.33
The data subject has the right to receive notice34 of and review35
records pertaining to him. Generally, personal information can be
processed only with the consent of the data subject.36
Each member state is expected to have an agency to oversee imple-
mentation of the Privacy Directive, and an EC "Working Party on the
Protection of Personal Data' 37 would help in harmonization.38 With
25 Privacy Directive, supra note 2.
26 Id. (1), at 3.
27 Id. T(2), at 3.
28 Id. (7), at 3.
29 Id. (4), at 3.
30 Id. (5), at 3.
31 Id. (6), at 3.
32 Id. (8), at 3.
33 Id. (10), at 4 (each portion of a file within a state is to be treated as a unique file).
34 Id. (13), at 4.
35 Id. (15), at 4.
36 Id. (16), at 4. Because the Privacy Directive allows for the Community's competing right to
freedom of information, the Directive allows member states to exclude the media in an attempt to
reach a balance between these interests. Id. (18), at 4.
37 Id. (23), at 4-5.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:159(1992)
January 1, 1993, as the target date, each member state must enact its own
laws to conform to the Privacy Directives objectives.39
B. Summary of Important Privacy Directive Provisions
Article 3 defines the scope of the Privacy Directive which applies to
all files in the private and public sector except records held by an individ-
ual and used only for private and personal reasons, the records of public
sector entities whose conduct is not subject to Community law, and the
records of voluntary members to non-profit organizations.' The Privacy
Directive's broad scope is intended to cover the main bulk of records
maintained within the EC. Article 4 provides that a member state's law
controls records located within its territory or anyone who uses terminals
within the member's territory to access records.4 1
Article 5 allows public sector entities to maintain only those records
necessary to carry out the purpose for which the entity was created. Sec-
ondary use of personal information is allowed only if the data subject
consents, the use is pursuant to law, will not hinder the data subject's
legitimate interests, is required to protect public safety, or to preserve
third party rights.42
Similarly, Article 8 covers the private sector, and absent consent,
allows private entities to create and maintain personal data records in
only three instances: if needed to fulfill contractual or quasi-contractual
duties; the data comes from public sources; or, the record holder's legiti-
mate interest outweighs the data subject's privacy.43
Reflecting the fist fundamental principle of fair information practice,
Article 9 requires the private sector record holder to notify the data sub-
ject of the existence, function, content and use of the record before infor-
mation is disclosed to others. If the data subject objects, the
unauthorized use must be stopped.' At the time information is collected
directly from the data subject, unless overburdensome to the entity, Arti-
cle 13 requires the requesting entity to give similar notice and inform the
38 Id. (24), at 5.
39 Id. ch. X, art. 31, at 12.
40 Id. ch. I, at 5-6.
41 Id. at 6.
42 Id. ch. II, at 6. Article 6 allows Members to determine when the communication of personal
data from public sector files is needed to fulfill the public entities responsibilities or the instances
when a private sector requestor's legitimate interest outweighs the data subject's interest. The data
subject, however, must be given notice of such communication. Id. at 6.
43 Id. ch. III, at 7.
44 Id. at 7. As an exception to Article 9 notice, under Article 10 a member state's supervisory
authority can determine when such notice would be impossible, overburdensome or when the con-
troller's or third party's interest outweighs the data subjects's privacy. Id.
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data subject of his/her data protection rights.45
Because disclosure is generally prohibited without the data subject's
express consent, Article 12 defines valid consent. The individual must be
told the function, contents, use and intended recipients of the informa-
tion and the name and address of the record holder," which constitutes
"informed consent."47
Article 16 relates to the quality of data maintained and illustrates
the second, third and fourth principles of fair information practice. Per-
sonal data must be fairly and lawfully obtained; maintained and used in
44a way compatible" to the record's purpose; be complete, relevant, accu-
rate, and timely; and, identifiable to the data subject for only the time
necessary to fulfill the reasons for which it is maintained.48
The security principle is reflected in Article 24 which prohibits a
member state from transferring data to a country considered to have in-
sufficient data protection laws, and requires the member state to report
such refusal so that the Commission can consider the status of the re-
questor.49 This provision threatens to exclude from the exchange of per-
sonal data with the EC the U.S. and any others whose privacy protocols
are deemed insufficient.
For oversight, Article 26 mandates that each member state create an
independent agency to monitor compliance with the Privacy Directive.50
Article 27 establishes a Working Party consisting of representatives from
each member state to oversee Community law as it relates to the Privacy
Directive."1
45 Id. ch. IV, at 8 (notice includes the record's function, the consequences of failing to reply, the
information recipients, his rights of access and to correct personal data and the record holder's name
and address). Additionally, Article 14 allows the data subject to challenge personal data use; not to
have administrative decisions made exclusively from "automatic processing of personal data defining
his profile or personality;" to know if a file exists, and if so, its contents, who holds the file and where
the file is located. Furthermore, the data subject can correct or delete information, prevent its use
and has a judicial remedy for Article 14 violations. Id.
46 Id. at 7-8.
47 The requirements for valid consent appear in Article 12 under the sub-heading "Informed
consent." Privacy Directive, supra note 2, ch. IV, art. 12, at 7.
48 Id. ch. V, at 9. Article 18 fulfills the sixth principle of fair information use by mandating
controllers of files to adopt security precautions necessary to prevent unauthorized access to or
change of personal data files. Id.
49 Id. ch. VIII, at 10. Article 25 allows member states to transfer data to another country that
does not have sufficient data protection laws if the receiving country adequately assures protection
for the data. Id. at 10.
50 Id. ch. IX, at 11.
51 Id. at 11.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:159(1992)
III. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS DIRECTIVE
Whereas the Privacy Directive deals generally with threats to pri-
vacy resulting from the processing of personal data, an additional Com-
mission proposal relates to the special privacy threats from the
telecommunications industry's use of personal information.52 The Tele-
communications Directive aims to permit growth of the telecommunica-
tions industry while protecting privacy. 3 Although the thrust of the
Telecommunications Directive is to limit the collection and use of per-
sonal data to that which is necessary to provide the telecommunication
service itself,54 it does not stand alone but must be applied in conjunction
with the Privacy Directive."
Under the Telecommunications Directive, personal data can be
maintained and used only to provide the service 6 but not to create "elec-
tronic profiles" of the service subscriber.57 Once collected, the informa-
tion can be retained only for as long as needed to provide and charge for
the service and resolve billing and service disputes between the provider
and the subscriber.5
As in the Privacy Directive, a subscriber has the right to know that
personal data files exist and to review and correct the record. 9 Without
the subscriber's prior consent, personal information cannot be disclosed
to anyone, including service supplier personnel who have no responsibil-
ity to help provide the subscribed service.' Additionally, the security
principle is observed by requiring the record holder/service provider to
reasonably ensure the security of such data and services.6 1
The Telecommunications Directive also addresses specific types of
data and services. For example, it identifies what data can be main-
tained62 and what procedures the provider of such services as "Caller-
ID"6 and "call forwarding"" must follow, and it describes how unsolic-
52 Telecommunications Directive, supra note 5.
53 Id. (12), at 13.
54 Id. (14), at 13.
55 Id. art. 2, at 14.
56 Id. art. 4, (I), at 14.
57 Id. art. 4, (2), at 14.
58 Id. art. 5, at 14.
59 Id. art. 6, at 14-15.
60 Id. art. 7, at 15.
61 Id. art. 8, at 15.
62 Id. arts. 9, 10, 11, at 15.
63 Id. arts. 12, 13, at 15-16. "Caller-ID" is not specifically mentioned in the Telecommunica-
tions Directive which uses "calling line identification." However, the service described is similar to
the "Caller-ID" service provided in the U.S.. In which case, it is the ability of the receiver of a call
to see the number of the person calling. The Telecommunications Directive also discusses the need
to provide "blocking," the ability to prevent disclosure of the caller's telephone number. Id.
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ited sales calls can be curtailed.65
IV. THE DIRECTIVE AND U.S. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
COMPARED
A. The Public Sector
Unlike the U.S. Privacy Act which pertains only to federal agen-
cies,66 the Privacy Directive governs public and private sector informa-
tion processing,67 but it does exclude files maintained privately for
personal reasons, such as one's own address book or telephone list.68
It is arguable that the Privacy Act itself largely would satisfy the
Directive,69 especially in light of the Computer Matching Privacy Act. 0
There is not much policy difference between the European and American
views on governmental information processing with respect to privacy
constraints insofar as the Directives and the Privacy Act are concerned.
Most American states do not have privacy legislation, however, to
govern their own information processing protocols, so this aspect of pub-
lic sector regulation is woefully inadequate. Some of the EC member
states are not in adequate compliance with either the Privacy Directive
64 Id. art. 14, at 16. Also an American service, "Call forwarding" is not specifically used in the
Telecommunications Directive either, but what is discussed is the transferring of calls to a third
party. Id.
65 Id. art. 17, at 16.
66 Under the Privacy Act, the definition of agency is found in section 552a(a)(1) which cross
references the definition of agency found in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(f).
Agency "includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Gov-
ernment controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C.
552(f) (1988).
67 For Directive application to public and private sectors, see supra notes 40, 42, 43 and accom-
panying text.
68 Privacy Directive, supra note 2, ch. 1, art. 3, (2)(a), at 5.
69 For example, § 552a (b) requires the data subject's written permission before the agency can
disclose any information about the individual. The Act, however, provides for several exceptions to
the written consent requirement. Id. § 552a(b)(1)-(12). Section 552a(d) allows the data subject
access to and amendment of his records. Section 552a(e) requires the agency to maintain only those
records to accomplish the agency's purpose and when possible, collect the information from the data
subject. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
70 Computer Matching Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (1988), as amended by,
Pub. L. No. 101-56, 103 Stat. 149 (1989) (codified within paragraphs of 5 U.S.C. § 552a). As a result
of this Act, an agency can disclose records that will be used in a computer matching program only
pursuant to a written agreement between the agency and the receiving agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o).
The Act specifies the agreement should contain provisions that provide notice, verify accuracy, en-
sure security and ensure retention for only as long as necessary. Id. Additionally, before an agency
can make a major decision using the records via a matching program, the Act requires the agency to
independently verify the information and give the data subject the opportunity to contest the find-
ings. Id. § 552a(p).
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or the Telecommunications Directive and will have to correct that,
though by and large the European nations have far more informational
privacy regulation than we do.7 '
B. The Secondary Use Limitation
A major sticking point, however, concerns the prohibition on the
secondary use of information, together with a requirement that informa-
tion be obtained directly from the data subject. The strict application of
these principles can place an unwelcome burden on data subjects who
may have to constantly re-supply information that is already on file with
a government agency or be pestered by requests for harmless secondary
uses. It would be sensible for information to be shared by agencies hav-
ing a proper interest in the same data and for benign secondary uses to be
permitted.
The Privacy Act sought to alleviate this problem for federal agencies
through the "routine use" exception to secondary use limitations:7 2 if a
purpose other than that for which the information was initially collected
is a matter of routine business to the record holder then it may disclose
the information.73 There is little satisfactory guidance as to what is a
"routine use," however, and the matter generally is left to the discretion
of each record holder.74 As a result, U.S. government agencies desig-
nated such broad areas of routine use as to gobble up the secondary use
limitation.7 5 In terms of the Privacy Act, the limitation is practically
useless.
There is legislation currently pending in Congress that would create
a federal data protection board and address some of the privacy deficien-
cies of the Privacy Act; but that proposal falls short when measured
against the requirements of the European Privacy Directive. Secondary
uses are not defined nor is the practice prohibited; the oversight mecha-
71 Information Technology Law Group EUROPE, BULLETIN (Autumn 1991) (European Data
Protection Survey Insert) As of February 91, 50% of the surveyed countries had data protection
laws and other countries had laws pending.
72 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) ("routine use" exception to non-disclosure of agency record).
73 As defined by the Act, routine use is "with respect to disclosure of a record, the use of such
record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a)(7).
74 The Privacy Act requires only that the agency publish its routine uses in the Federal Register.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D), (e)(11).
75 137 Cong. Rec. H3449-50 (1991) (Mr. Wise's criticism of "routine use"). See generally, The
Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society 516-21 (1977)
(discussing extensive agency reliance on routine use to exchange information); Todd Robert Coles,
Comment, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right of Privacy? An Examination of the Rou-
tine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957 (1991).
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nism is limited mainly to "jaw boning" and has little enforcement
power.76 It is likely that the U.S. might still be excluded from trans bor-
der data flow even if this proposal passes.
C. Private Sector Regulation
The private sector in the United States is largely unregulated in
terms of information management. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) does provide some rights of access by the data subject to credit
records maintained about him or her," but that law falls far short of the
constraints of the Privacy Directive.78 Not only is the secondary use lim-
itation insufficiently satisfied by the FCRA, but the private sector would
be permitted by the Privacy Directive to maintain personal records only
with the consent of the data subject except if (1) necessary to fulfill the
record holder's contractual duties, (2) the information comes from a pub-
lic source, or (3) the record holder's legitimate interest is superior to the
privacy interest of the data subject. 79 The FCRA does not place such
restrictions on the maintenance of credit records.
The situation in this country regarding incursions on informational
privacy will increase markedly with the constant movement toward the
point-of-sale electronic funds transfer system. This technology poses the
possibility of a minute-by-minute description of a consumer's behavior in
fine-grained detail. Such a collection of information, and the wide range
76 One measure of H.R. 685, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) which was introduced January 29,
1991 by its sponsor Representative Robert Wise, would create a "Data Protection Board."
Although the Board is to develop guidelines and models for acceptable routine uses, the act does not
require the Board to permit secondary uses only with the informed consent of the data subject. The
Board also is mainly an advisory and investigative body whose only real enforcement power is the
ability to hold hearings and issue subpoenas requiring attendance or production of files. The Board
would not have the ability to sanction individuals, instead, it is to report Privacy Act violations to
other offices. H.R. 685, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Representative Wise also chaired a hearing to address potential consequences in international
trade for the U.S. and its businesses if the United States fails to adequately protect privacy from the
increased compilations of personal information in public and private sectors. The hearing discussed
the creation of a Privacy Protection Commission and a possible Data Protection Act. See generally,
Data Protection Hearing, supra note 10, at 2 (opening statement of Robert E. Wise, Jr., chairman of
the subcommittee) (the focus of the hearing was Computer Privacy and H.R. 3669 and the Data
Protection Act of 1990).
77 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1988) (disclosure to consumer of information and the source and recipi-
ents of the information); see also, supra notes 22, 23, 24, and accompanying text for Fair Credit
Reporting Act rights.
78 Although the Fair Credit Reporting Act provides a list of the only permitted consumer report
disclosures, it does not adequately address secondary use. One permitted disclosure is for a "legiti-
mate business need." 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(E) (1988). However, this section does not necessitate
balancing the business need against the possible invasion of privacy.
79 See, supra text accompanying note 43 for when the Privacy Directive allows disclosure in
private sector without consent.
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of uses made of it by private sector enterprise, are well beyond the most
minimal restrictions of the Privacy Directive. 0
D. Telecommunications and Privacy
There are some U.S. telecommunications regulations regarding pri-
vacy and personal information, but not much.81 Subsequent to the
break-up of our Bell System,8 2 a variety of entrepreneurs have begun to
provide telecommunications services which vary from state to state and
are virtually unregulated with respect to customer information practices.
"Caller I.D.," for instance, has been approved in some states without any
opportunity for the caller to block disclosure of his phone number;83
other states have required this option.84 Additionally, the regional Bell
companies which replaced the national Bell System have recently been
permitted to develop and market data bases so they themselves can sup-
ply information about customers;8 5 previously, message-switching was
the principal function of the "Baby Bells." 86 It is yet to be seen what
new dimensions of telephone customer information profiles will be devel-
oped and exchanged, but the very idea of doing so is counter to the Euro-
pean Telecommunications Directive.
80 For a discussion of Lotus' Marketplace, a CD-ROM, see supra note 10.
81 Computer Matching Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (1988), as amended by,
Pub. L. No. 101-56, 103 Stat. 149 (1989) (codified within paragraphs of 5 U.S.C. § 552a); Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988) (prohibits disclosure of personal informa-
tion in video rental records); Electronic Communications and Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (regulates interception of wire, oral
and electronic communications); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 631, Pub. L. No. 98-
549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 551) (regulates disclosure of cable television subscriber
records); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (regu-
lates telemarketing and telephone solicitation).
82 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, New York State
Dep't. of Pub. Serv. v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983) (court approval of AT&T's reorganiza-
tional plan).
83 1992 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 55-1992, § 2 (West) (to be codified at Ind. Code § 8-1-2.9) (no
blocking except for law enforcement and commission certified crisis agencies).
84 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2893 (West 1991) ("individual" blocking with no charge); N.D. Cent.
Code § 49-21-01.6 (1991) ("per call" blocking at no charge).
85 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 332 (D.D.C. 1991), stay vacated, 1991
WL 238308 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (although enforcement of the decision was delayed, court removed
restriction of consent decree thus allowing Regional Companies into information service market).
Presently, S. 2112, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) and H.R. 3515, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
are two pending bills which would amend the Communications Act of 1934 and limit the ability of
regional companies to provide information services.
86 Western Elec., 767 F. Supp. at 310, n.4 (consent decree did not allow Regional Operating
companies to furnish "information services"). The court also noted, however, that the Regional
Operating companies were providing other services including: cellular and cable television services
abroad. Id. at 318-19.
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V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: WEAKENING THE DIRECTIVE?
At the time this article was about to be submitted for publication the
European Parliament (EP), had approved the foregoing Directives but
proposed some amendments which would have the effect of diluting the
privacy protection proposals.87 The EP is mostly an advisory body in the
EC legislative process. The Council could refuse or modify the amend-
ments and send the Directives to the member states for action. 8 It is
probably safe to predict that, given (1) the commitment of the Council to
privacy protection as evidenced over the years in which the Directives
were fashioned, and (2) the EP's amendments were the result of report-
edly massive lobbying by U.S. multinational corporations, the Council
will not retreat significantly from its privacy stance.8 9 Nevertheless, the
overwhelming EP vote in favor of the amendments might indicate some
popular support for them back home and they cannot be discounted.9"
The amendments to the Telecommunications Directive do not ap-
pear to be significant in privacy terms and will not be discussed here.
The Privacy Directive amendments are another matter, however, and de-
serve attention. Though some of the amendments seem to strengthen the
scope and quality of privacy protection, others have the reverse effect.
A. Removing Distinctions Between Public and Private Bodies
The Privacy Directive had treated separately the public and private
sectors, setting out somewhat different standards for each.91 The amend-
ments would eliminate the differences and treat both sectors alike. As a
result, there is sharper focus on the processing of the data without regard
to who is doing it.92 Such amendments do not appear to be objectionable
87 EC Parliament Approves Data Privacy Legislation, REUTERS LIBRARY REPORT, March 11,
1992, available on LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLNWS File (EP approved the legislation but several
amendments were proposed).
88 For a discussion of the EC legislative process, see supra note 3.
89 The Commission has indicated most of the suggested amendments will not be accepted. Data
Protection: EC Proposal on Data Protection Likely to Undergo Modifications, MILLIN PUBLICA-
TIONS, INC., EUROWATCH, March 20, 1992, available in, LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLNWS File
(Commission has not adopted a "common position" as of March 20, 1992).
90 Although the EP unanimously approved of the proposals, criticism from the banks, credit
companies and other industries may have influenced the EP's adoption of the amendments. Id.
91 Privacy Directive, supra note 2, ch. II at 6 (public sector processing); Privacy Directive, supra
note 2, ch. III, at 7 (private sector processing). For a discussion of these chapters, see supra notes 40,
42, 43 and accompanying text.
92 Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizen's Rights on the Proposal from the
Commission to the Council for a Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation to
the Processing of Personal Data (COM(90) 0314 - C3-0323/90 - SYN 287), on the Proposal From
the Commission to the Council for a Directive Concerning the Protection of Personal Data and
Privacy in the Context of Public Digital Telecommunications Networks, in Particular the Integrated
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from a privacy perspective and in fact may be a more straightforward
approach to information management.
B. Excluding the "Press" From Coverage.
One amendment excludes from privacy regulation the "press, pho-
tography, cinematography, radio or television" ventures which inform
the public.93 Although at first blush it seems that this might be consis-
tent with U.S. First Amendment principles, consider that in this country
the press generally has no greater rights than any member of the public.
Accordingly, there is no reason, from the U.S. perspective, to give a spe-
cial pass to the press. Indeed, there is danger that with exemption the
news media could become a gaping hole through which personal data
could be funneled without restriction. If there is no regulation of the
press then presumably it could obtain, process and disseminate personal
information as it chooses. Once personal information has been made
public by the media, then arguably the privacy interests have been elimi-
nated and the information itself is in the public domain and outside the
scope of the Privacy Directive.94 Such a result ought not be the case in
Europe or in the United States, and the amendments deserve careful
scrutiny in this regard.
C. Secondary Usage Expanded
Though the general prohibition in Article 8 on secondary use is
maintained, the list of permissible disclosures is expanded considerably
to include instances where a third party's justified interest has been "con-
vincingly" proven, the information was obtained from public sources,
disclosure will protect public or third party interests or the information
Services Digital Network (ISDN) and Public Digital Mobile Networks COM(90) 0314 - C3-0324/90
- SYN 288), on the Proposal from the Commission to the Council for a Decision in the Field of
Information Security COM(90) 0314 - C3-0325/90) (Jan. 15, 1992) (Rapporteur Geoffrey Hoon)
[hereinafter Hoon Report].
For example, Amendments 27, 28 and 29 delete Chapter II of the Privacy Directive which
specifically addresses the public sector. Id. at 12-14. Other amendments change references to "pri-
vate sector files" to "data" generally. Id, amend. 4, at 5. Amendment 21 changes the scope of the
Privacy Directive which applied to files in the "public and private sectors," to "personal data held by
all authorities and organizations constituted under public law, and by other natural and legal per-
sons .. "Id. at 10.
93 Id. amend. 22, at 10-11.
94 An invasion of privacy cannot occur by publishing facts that are already public, they are no
longer private. See, e.g., Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 719 (4th Cir. 1991) (facts
in public domain not private) (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989); Heath v.
Playboy Enters., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (publishing facts already published
in other magazine not invasion of privacy).
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consists of names and addresses for direct marketing.9" Such a list cre-
ates endless uncertainty regarding what disclosures might be appropriate,
is subject to the same kinds of objection as the "routine use" exception of
the Privacy Act and has the potential of emasculating informational pri-
vacy safeguards.
Also, another amendment significantly weakens Article 9 which
says that upon the data subject's objection, an unauthorized use must be
stopped.96 The amendment would bar only unauthorized disclosure97
which presumably would allow the record holder itself to make offensive
secondary use of personal data in its possession.
D. Discretion in Transfers to Nonconforming Countries
Finally, an amendment to Article 24 would allow member states the
discretion to prohibit the transfer of certain categories of data to noncon-
forming countries, replacing the total prohibition on transfer and notice
to the Commission which the draft Directive now requires.98 Such dis-
cretion would allow transfer of information to "data haven" nations
where, free of privacy regulation, the data could be processed and dis-
closed to anyone for any purpose. Such a provision could result in a
complete bypass of the Privacy Directive regulation.
Though there are EP amendments other than those mentioned
above that may or may not pass privacy muster, these particular ones are
so offensive to privacy interests and fair information practices as to be
likely candidates for Council rejection without much debate. The other
amendments do not seem to pose serious privacy threats.
VI. CONCLUSION
It will be ironic, indeed, if Europe's insistence on the protection of
human rights causes this country to pay some real attention to informa-
tional privacy in both the public and private sectors. Usually we are in
the position of lecturing other nations about the sanctity of fundamental
human rights; in the informational privacy dimension we are the ones
who must be lectured.
Of course the EC member states have yet to consider fully the Pri-
vacy and the Telecommunications Directives and the EP amendments
must yet be confronted; it is not likely that these matters will be resolved
by January, 1993. But it is also clear that though the EC may step back
95 Hoon Report, supra note 92, amend. 32, at 16.
96 Privacy Directive, supra note 2, ch. III, at 7.
97 Hoon Report, supra note 92, amend. 35, at 17.
98 Id. amend. 78, at 31.
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somewhat from the requirements of the Directives, the United States is
already out of step with much of Europe's informational privacy con-
straints.99 At a minimum, the secondary use limitation cannot continue
to be short-circuited by American government and completely ignored
by our private sector. A protocol between "all" or "nothing" regarding
secondary use must be devised if we expect to participate in international
transborder data flow of personal information. Given the reality of the
"information society" worldwide, this is an arena in which we must play
the game and we have to recognize that others may make the rules.
99 See generally David H. Flaherty, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES
(1989).
